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Abstract 
 
A theory is said to be fully absorbable whenever its own acceptance by all of the individuals 
belonging to a certain population does not question its predictive validity. This accounts for 
strategic equilibria and can be related to the logic underlying convergence of behaviour and 
intentional herding in sequential games. This paper discusses the absorbability of informational 
cascades’ theory by bounded rational decision-makers and analyses whether providing individuals 
with theoretic information on informational cascades affects overall probability of herding 
phenomena to occur as well as whether an incorrect cascade can be reversed because of bounded 
rational adapting of the theory’s prescriptive. 
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1 Introduction 
The concept of “theory absorption” points at the recursive effects economic theories may have on the system 
they aim at describing. Although potentially any economic theory can be absorbed for the resolution of a 
concrete problem (Dacey, 1976), the way a theory gets absorbed may differ from case to case, depending on 
its formulation, its accessibility, its understanding, and its acceptance by the individuals (Morgenstern, 
1972). Adding to that, past experiences and learning may matter as well. 
A theory is said to be absorbed by an individual if that individual accepts its logical and prescriptive 
content and chooses to act according to it. In interactive contexts, theory absorption will also be strongly 
related to the supposed behaviours of the others. Thus, it can be distinguished among unilaterally-
absorbable theories, partially-absorbable theories, and fully-absorbable theories, depending on the 
number of individuals – from one to all – who follow its prescriptions and are satisfied with the result, so 
that, ceteris paribus, there would not be any reason for the individuals to modify the theory on which to rely, 
or in other words the theory to absorb (Güth and Kliemt, 2004). 
Whereas relying on a neoclassical approach, a strong form of theory absorption should be 
unquestionable, focussing on the boundaries of individual rationality implies theory absorption to be adapted 
at least to the individual predictions of the others’ behaviour. 
Based on an experiment on informational cascades we discuss the requirements of equilibrium 
theory absorption and test experimentally the effects of informing the players about how to derive the 
individual optimal decision rule. 
In this paper we will try to apply the notion of theory absorption to the analysis of herd behaviour 
and in particular to the occurrence of informational cascades in an experimental investment task. Providing 
the subjects with theoretic information on probability assessment could make them aware of fragility and 
idiosyncrasy of informational cascades and thus affect the probability of (erroneous) cascades to occur. 
The paper is organized as follows: after a short review of studies on herding and informational 
cascades, a simple model provides the theoretical framework for explaining the phenomenon of 
informational cascades (section 2). The experimental design is presented in section 3, followed by the 
experimental results (section 4), to which the conclusions inform (section 5). 
 
2 Herding and Informational Cascades 
Conformity and fluctuations in mass behaviour are frequent features characterising many social and 
economic situations (see e.g. Welch, 1992; Neeman and Orosel, 1999, Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Welch, 
2000; and Kennedy, 2002). Individuals are influenced by the behaviour of the others, as it can be 
informative to many extends and promote what has been depicted as social learning (see Douglas and Gale, 
1996; and Bikhchandani et al., 1998, for surveys). Trying to learn from the others typically induces imitative 
behaviour, that can be under some circumstances rational even when it implies choosing differently than 
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solely relying on own information. Thus, it can come to situations in which erroneous, inefficient outcomes 
arise, despite individual rational behaviour. 
In the last decade, studies on ‘herding’ were abundant. Herd behaviour refers to the phenomenon 
according to which people follow the example of other people ignoring their private information. This kind 
of behaviour was first pointed out by Becker (1991) and was then developed by Banerjee (1992) and 
Bikhchandani et al. (1992) 
Herding models and informational cascades have several attractive features for studying rationality 
and learning: the rational action is independent by subjects’ preference. Additionally, herding model and 
informational cascades are interactive, have a clear economic interpretation, and are very simple to explain. 
They represent therefore an excellent framework to tackle our research objective, namely, experimentally 
testing theory absorption among bounded rational decision makers. 
Studying herd behaviour could be useful to explain countless social and economic issues. In the real 
world people make their decision sequentially. In the process of decision making, subjects will observe the 
decisions taken by previous subjects, and will surely be influenced by that information. For example, when 
having to choose between two restaurants, in absence of other information, we will often prefer the one more 
crowded. This behaviour seems intuitively rational because we assume that someone among the diners 
knows something about the quality of the restaurant. This kind of logic holds for all subjects. Consequently, 
if the first few subjects, in absence of other information, decide to queue in front of a restaurant randomly, 
then all the latter subjects, in absence of other relevant information, will join the queue. This will produce a 
perverse mechanism: joining the queue will become more likely each time a new subject queues up (Becker, 
1991). 
The basic idea of herd behaviour is very simple: ignoring private information and joining the queue. 
The assumption that agents possess rational expectations is usually being used to assert that an agent, 
although not familiar with the true model, could reach an efficient outcome drawing on all available 
information including the one acquired observing other people’s actions. In a standard decision-making 
process, we assume that people act sequentially and that the history of the game is common knowledge1. 
Hence, subjects’ decisions are influenced both by their private information and by the actions of previous 
players, not knowing, of course on which information the choices were based upon. People’s choices will 
therefore be correlated even if their personal information and background are different, and mistakes by early 
decision-makers will influence the choices of latter ones. This will, most probably, result in the delay of the 
discovery of the ‘right’ answer and may even prevent it altogether. 
Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandeni et al (1992) proposed, respectively, a simple model of herd 
behaviour and a model of informational cascades. In these models subjects act sequentially and have to 
detect a ‘winning action’ a among a set of possible actions. In the first model this set is the interval [0, 1]∈  
                                               
1
 By common knowledge we mean that at time t player t knows all the actions taken by previous players. 
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R, while in the second one a is an element of [0, 1] ∈  N. Additionally, while Banerjee’s model differentiates 
between two kinds of subjects – informed subjects and un-informed subjects – in the model proposed by 
Bikhchandeni et al, all subjects are informed. 
Bikhchandeni et al (1992) analysis is devoted to explain not only conformity among agents but also 
“rapid and short-lived fluctuations such as fads, fashions, booms and crashes”. They point out that the 
conformity of followers in a cascade contains no informational value. In this sense, the cascade is fragile, as 
it can be upset by the arrival of new public information (note that if superior information does not arrive it is 
impossible to reverse the cascade), and idiosyncratic, “in that random events combined with the choices of 
the first few players determine the type of behaviour on which individuals herd” (Bikhchandani and Sharma, 
2001). 
Fragility of informational cascades was experimentally investigated by Willinger and Ziegelmeyer 
(1998). The authors develop a model based on Bikhchandani et al in which some agents receive more 
accurate information2. They find that this mechanism decreases the occurrence of cascades and breaks off 
herding. 
2.1 A Simple Model of Informational Cascades: a Dichotomy Choice Model 
An informational cascade occurs when people prefer to ignore their own piece of information and follow 
what others are doing. The game involves N players who must decide sequentially between two options: urn 
B (for black) and urn W (for white). In urn B there are two black balls and one white ball, whereas in urn W 
there are two white balls and one black ball. One of the two urns is randomly chosen. Player 1 draws a ball, 
and then guesses the chosen urn. Her payoff is 1 if her guess is correct and 0 otherwise. Player 2 observes 
player 1’s choice, draws a ball from the same urn, and then makes her choice. Player 3 observes both 
previous players’ choice, draws a ball and makes her choice, and so on until player N. Rationality requires 
player 1 to choose the black (white) urn when she draws a black (white) ball.  
Player 2 therefore faces one of the following scenarios: 
1. She draws a black ball, after having observed player 1 to choose the black urn; 
2. She draws a white ball, after having observed player 1 to choose the black urn; 
3. She draws a black ball, after having observed player 1 to choose the white urn; 
4.  She draws a white ball, after having observed player 1 to choose the white urn; 
 
A rational player 2 should choose the black urn in scenario (1) and the white urn in scenario (4). In scenarios 
(2) and (3), she should be indifferent between the two urns, and assign equal probability to each of them. 
 
                                               
2
 More precisely, those agents who have to decide immediately after the occurrence of a cascade can observe 
an additional private signal. 
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Under these assumptions, Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch calculate the unconditional ex-ante 
probabilities of “White-cascade”, “No-cascade” and “Black-cascade”after two individuals have played: 
“White-cascade” =  
2
1 2pp +−
 ; “No-cascade” = 2pp −  (2); “Black-cascade” = 
2
1 2pp +−
 ; and after 
an even number of players n = 2m have played we have: “White-cascade”= 
2
)(1 2 mpp −−
 ; “No-cascade” 
= 
mpp )( 2−  ; “Black-cascade”= 
2
)(1 2 mpp −−
, where p is the probability of observing a correct signal. 
Note that the bigger p is, the sooner an information cascade can start (figure 2). 
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch calculate also the probability of ending up in the correct cascade after 
two players have played, given that the chosen urn is W: “White-cascade” = 
2
)1( +pp
 ; “No-cascade” = 
)1( pp − ; and “Black-cascade” = 
2
)1)(2( −− pp
 ; and in the general case (figure 2): 
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−−+
    (1) 
“No-cascade” = mpp )( 2−       (2) 
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2
2
pp
pppp m
+−
−−−−
   (3) 
Equation (1) is the probability of observing a correct cascade. Although this probability increases in p and m, 
even for very informative signals (p close to 1), the probability of a wrong cascade (equation (3)) remains 
remarkably high. 
 
 
Figure 1: Probability of starting a cascade as a function of p, 
the correctness of the signal (N  = 10) 
Figure 2: Probability of a correct (continuous line) and 
incorrect cascade (dotted line) as a function of p, the 
correctness of signal (N = 10) 
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3 Experimental Design  
To test experimentally this theoretical prediction, we ran two treatments. The control one replicated the 
design by Bikhchandani et al. The ‘absorption’ treatment the participants received theoretical information 
about informational cascades. More precisely, the respondents in the absorption treatment were provided 
with an illustration of how to infer the expected value of adoption and rejection in dependency on the 
accuracy of the private signal and of how to deduce the individual optimal decision rule.3 The experimental 
hypothesis underlying the absorption treatment is that the theoretic information provided can prevent 
incorrect cascades to occur. 
The experiment was programmed using the Z-tree software of Urs Fischbacher (1999) and was run at 
the laboratory of ESSE at the University of Bari. 
Each treatment, lasting for about an hour, was made up of 22 periods, 2 of which were trial ones. The 
trial periods were necessary for subjects to become friendly with the treatment, allowing them to ask 
questions about the experiment’s instructions (available on request). The final payment was made on only 
the 20 real periods and paid at the end of each treatment. 
In each session we had N = 10 subjects, sitting next to a PC terminal connected by a net. The 
subjects could not see each other or communicate. All of them were undergraduate students in Economics 
not familiar with previous similar experiments. 
Subjects in the experiment were asked to decide whether to invest in a new product or not. In each 
period, lasting for about two minutes, subjects played sequentially in a randomly determined order. They 
were informed about their turn via a message on their PC screen. Subjects did not know whether the new 
product would be profitable or not. There were two equally likely events. If the product was successful (V = 
1), they would gain 0.5€ in case of investment, and zero otherwise. If the product was not successful (V = 0), 
they would gain 0.5€ in case of non investment (the right decision), and zero otherwise. To exclude losses by 
participants, we did not consider the cost of adopting as Bikhchandani et al. did. In each period the true value 
of V was exogenously determined but not revealed to the subjects, who saw only a free-of-charge signal S (a 
sort of a result of a market survey) that had a probability p = 0.75 of being correct. 
In every period of the control treatment, subjects were informed about: their own turn to play, all 
previous guesses, and their own signal. In the ‘absorption’ treatment, subjects received, in addition to such 
information, a decisional aid. This was formulated in form of tips about the game and contained theoretic 
information on how to derive, in dependency of individual turn to make his / her choice, the unconditional 
ex-ante probabilities of ending up respective in a correct or in an incorrect cascade, rather than to escape it. 
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 Example: “[…] if all the 4 players before you have chosen to invest, they all probably received a signal equal “1”. 
Therefore, if you receive a signal equal “1”, you better choose to invest, too. BUT, what would you do, if you receive a 
signal equal “0”? You can think that, if the signal was “1” in 4 of the 5 cases, and “0” just in your one case, the 
probability that given all signals sales will go well can be calculated this way: 
1/5⋅0.75+1/5⋅0.75+1/5⋅0.75+1/5⋅0.75+1/5⋅0.25. This is because, in the first fifth of cases (for the 1st out of 5 players) the 
probability that given the signal sales will go well is 0.75, so that it counts for 1/5⋅0.75. […]” 
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At the end of each period, subjects in both treatments were informed about the true value of V, and their 
period-payoff. When all periods were played, the subjects were paid and could leave the laboratory. Average 
earnings were 7€. 
 
4 Results 
The experimental results enable to discuss some aspects of absorbability of informational cascades’ 
theory by bounded rational decision-makers. The experimental hypothesis which argues whether 
providing individuals with theoretic information on informational cascades affects the overall 
probability of herding phenomena and that of their reversal will be in particular discussed focussing 
on the general effects of theory absorption, comparing the social efficiency of outcomes among 
treatments and testing for directional learning. The main results this experiment accounts for can be 
discussed as follows. 
4.1 General Effects of Theory Absorption 
Considering the benchmark provided by the theory on herding (and informational cascades), it is 
possible to qualify the individual choices observed in the experiment as rational or irrational, 
respectively if they are conform to the optimal strategy or not. In the experimental simple set-up, 
where the two states of nature are equally probable and the private signals identically distributed, 
the optimal strategy in a Bayesian sense can be defined taking into account the decision of the 
predecessors and the individual’s private information, as doing the count on the previous decisions 
(the one’s own signal being included)4 and adopting the most chosen option. The adoption of the 
tie-breaking rule if indifferent has been assessed as rational (optimal) behaviour, both if generating 
a cascade or not. Further, the case in which “an imbalance of previous inferred signals causes a 
person’s optimal decision to be inconsistent with his or her private signal”5 has been considered as 
a cascade.  
Choice which were not consistent with these rules has been qualified as irrational, whereas it 
has been distinguished between two subspecies of irrational behaviour, which have been labelled as 
“signal-keeping” and “not-rationalized.” They respective correspond to the cases in which 
following one’s own private signal can provide a somehow logical explanation of the individual’s 
choice and to those in which there is no plausible explanation for it. According to these criteria the 
choices of the experimental subjects can be grouped and summarized as shown by Table 1. 
                                               
4
 Cf. Anderson and Holt (1997). 
5
 Cf. Anderson and Holt (1997), p. 851. 
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  Irrational 
 
Signal Rational (Bayes’ rule) 
not rationalized Signal-keeping 
Control Treatment 0,72 0,725 0,15 0,135 
Absorption Treatment 0,715 0,935 0,035 0,04 
Table 1: Classification of the individual behaviours observed 
 
It can be clearly noted that providing the respondents with theoretical information about the 
optimal Bayesian strategy yields for higher consistency of behaviour with the theoretical predictions 
and among the irrational choices for the lowering of adoption of non-rationalized behaviours. 
The higher compliance with the Bayesian optimal strategy provides evidence for the 
absorption of the theoretical predictions6. 
A further interesting feature which emerges from the experimental data is that while the 
frequency of optimal behaviour is higher in the absorption than in the control treatment, the overall 
frequency of signal following is almost the same among treatments (72 % in the control treatment 
versus 71.5 % in the absorption one). This seems to further hint at the internalization of the optimal 
decision-rule and further corroborate the hypothesis of absorption of informational cascades’ theory 
by bounded rational decision-makers. 
The two treatments gave account for a different occurrence of informational cascades. It has 
been in particular considered, how many informational cascades which could have formed occurred 
in fact. In this insight, a cascade has been considered as possible to occur whenever the choice 
between following one’s own private information and Bayesian optimization are mutually 
exclusive. In all of these cases, an informational cascade takes place if the individual ignore her 
own signal and prefer to herd. 
According to these criteria, while in the control treatment 25 of the 52 possible 
informational cascades formed in the absorption treatment 51 out of the 59 informational cascades 
that would have been possible established. This acknowledges for the percentages which are shown 
by Table 2. 
  Cascades occurrence (%) Correct cascades (%) Wrong cascades (%) 
Control Treatment 48.07 24 76 
Absorption Treatment 86.66  49.02 50.98 
Table 2: Perceptual occurrence of informational cascades 
                                               
6
 At a 0.01 significance level. 
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Fragility of cascades is higher in the control treatment, in which in particular it never 
happened that a cascade starts at the beginning of the period and last until the end of it. Instead, in 
the absorption treatment, informational cascades and herding seem to be more difficult to reverse. 
In this insight, it should be however considered that the occurrence of correct cascades is higher in 
the absorption than in the control treatment: while in the control treatment only 9 of the 25 
informational cascades which affirmed were correct, in the absorption 25 correct and 26 wrong 
cascades formed. Table 2 summarizes the relative occurrence of correct and wrong cascades in 
perceptual values. 
4.2 Social Efficiency 
For testing if proving the respondents of theoretical information on the optimal decision-rule 
enhances their profits, improves their winning chances and better therefore the efficiency degree of 
the outcome, the earnings distribution per position in the queue per treatment can be compared (see 
figure 2). 
We can accept at a 95% significance level that earnings are higher, on average, in the 
absorption than in the control treatment. 
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Figure 2: Average earnings per position in the queue per treatment 
 
The percentage of winning per position in the queue (see figure 3) which can be considered 
as a proxy for the individual utility is clearly higher in the absorption than in the control treatment, 
this difference being significant with p<0.043  
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Figure 3: Percentages of winning per position in the queue per treatment 
 
In this sense, providing the individuals with theoretical information on herding behaviour 
and informational cascades reveals to be a device which can be preferable both from the social and 
from the individual point of view. 
Figure 4 illustrates the percentages with which the winning strategy has been per period 
adopted in each treatment. At a significance level of 99% higher adoption of the optimal decision-
rule implies that the individuals are able to conceptualize the theory and to refer it on the setting 
they face.  
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Figure 4: Percentages of optimal strategy per treatment 
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4.3 Learning 
In order to appreciate whether learning effects occurred in the experimental setting the 20 game-
playing periods can be divided onto 4 groups. The average percentages of deviations from the 
optimal strategy per classes of periods (see figure 5) does seem to corroborate the idea of a marked 
learning process, neither in the control nor in the absorption treatment. In particular in the control 
treatment, a slight tendency toward the reduction of deviant choices can be noted. 
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Figure 5: Average percentages of deviant strategies per classes of periods 
 
The occurrence of directional learning can be further investigated by constructing a simple 
learning model in which choices are associated with a set of variables. These are respective the 
period number (“Time”), the eventual concavity of the learning process (“Time2”) and a 
determinant detecting the presence of directional learning.7 That for it has been made use of a 
dummy variable equal to 1 whenever the subject made the theoretically correct decision and won 
(“Correctwon”) as well as of a dummy equal to 1 in case that theory conform behaviour did not 
ensure a positive payoff (“Correctlost”). Finally, the dummy “Correct,” which equals 1 if the 
subject choice complies with the theory, has been chosen as the dependent variable for running a 
probit estimation procedure whose results are visualized in table 3.  
 
 
 
                                               
7
 Directional learning has been also labelled “Cournot behaviour” (Selten and Buchta, 1998). 
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Dep. Variable: Correct Marginal Effect Std. Error p-value 
Time .01244 .01398 0.374 
Time2 -.00045 .00064 0.485 
Correctwon -.07991 .04271 0.067 
Correctlost -.09943 .07300 0.130 
‘absorption’ treatment .27888 .03797 0.000 
    
Log likelihood -169.982   
Pseudo R2 0.1387   
NOBs 400   
 
Table 3: Maximum Likelihood probit estimation for a learning model 
 
From our results, we can notice no trend in observing a more consistent decisions over time: 
indeed, Time is not statistically significant. As a consequence, concavity for learning is not 
statistically significant, either. Yet, directional learning is not a determinant of learning. Indeed, 
even if Correctwon is significant, nevertheless it does not present the correct direction (positive 
sign) in our analysis. In fact, we expect probability of making the correct decision to increase if in 
the previous period subject made correct decision and won.  
However, we can observe that the dummy variable for the ‘absorption’ treatment is highly 
statistically significant; providing the subjects with theoretical information on informational 
cascades constitutes a decisional aid which is effective in increasing the probability of making the 
correct decision by 28 %. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
Herding behaviour and informational cascades refer to cases in which individual rational behaviour 
may result in a non-optimal strategy at aggregate level. As suggested by Becker (1991), these 
phenomena deal with situations in which information can be somehow linked with negative 
externalities. By conformity to the behaviour of the preceding subjects ignoring ones’ own private 
information, the behaviour of the others stops being informative. Therefore, some studies on 
herding argue if “society may actually be better off by constraining some of the people to use only 
their own information” (Banarjee, 1992, p. 798).This has been also acknowledged by some 
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empirical evidence (see e.g. Fiore and Morone, 2007). Shifting the perspective, the present study 
investigates whether providing the individuals acting in settings in which herding and informational 
cascades are likely to occur with the theoretical principle of Bayesian optimization constitute an 
alternative mechanism for improving the degree of social efficiency. 
The evidence from this experiment seems to corroborate this idea, in that average earnings 
and the percentage of winning per position in the queue were higher among the responders who 
received the theoretic information than among those who did not. In this sense, providing the 
individuals with theoretical information on herding behaviour and informational cascades reveals to 
be preferable both from the social and from the individual point of view. 
The experimental evidence further proves that theoretic information on informational 
cascades affects the overall probability of herding phenomena and that of their reversal. It could be 
in particular observed that the behaviour of the respondents who received the theoretic information 
revealed a higher consistency and compliance with the theoretical prescriptions and yields for 
lowering the occurrence of non-rationalized behaviour. The higher compliance with the Bayesian 
optimal strategy corroborates the hypothesis of absorbability of informational cascades’ theory, 
revealing its understanding and acceptance by bounded rational individuals. The theoretic 
information did not affect the propensity of the individuals to rely on their own private information. 
The overall occurrence of informational cascades was higher among informed than among 
uniformed individuals, whereas the frequency of correct cascades was more than double. Thus 
providing the individuals with theoretical information on herding behaviour and informational 
cascades reveals to be a device improving the occurrence of case in which a cascade can be 
associated with an individually and collectively favourable outcome. Informational cascades seem 
however to be less fragile and more difficult to be reversed among individuals who are aware of the 
theoretical prescriptions. 
The experimental results provide, in none of the treatments, significant evidence for marked 
patterns of directional learning concerning the application of the optimal decision-rule. Directional 
learning could not namely be acknowledged, as decisions do neither become more consistent over 
time, nor the probability of choosing correctly is directly correlated with having won because of 
having chosen right in the precedent period. From the evidence of the absorption treatment, 
however, providing the subjects with theoretical information on herding reveals to be an efficient 
device for increasing the accuracy of decision. 
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A – Instructions (original provided in Italian) 
Welcome! This experiment is designed to study how people make decisions. The experiment is 
very simple, and you will have the possibility of earning money, which will be paid to you in cash 
at the end of the experiment.  
This amount will depend, on the one hand, on your decisions and, on the other hand, on luck.  
 
You will play as an entrepreneur and your task will be to decide to develop a new product or 
not.  
Two scenarios will have the same probability to occur: or all goods will be sold or not a 
single one. 
You will repeat your task 20 times. In each period, the computer will choose the scenario. 
The  scenario will be the same for all the participant, but different in each period.    
Whenever you take the right decision, you will earn 0.5€, nothing otherwise, as shown in the 
table: 
 
 Decision: to invest Decision: not to invest 
All goods sold 0.5€ 0 
No good sold 0 0.5€ 
 
It is important to know that you make your decision in sequence and the order is randomized 
in each period.  
However, you will be provided with two different kinds of information before making your 
decision.  
First, you will receive results from a market survey reliable at 75%. In particular, during the 
experiment you will be provided with a signal according to the result of the survey. As shown in 
the table, to each signal is connected a different likelihood of the two scenarios:  
 
 Signal = 1 Signal = 0 
All goods sold 75% 25% 
No good sold 25% 75% 
   
Second, you will be informed about decisions already made by all entrepreneurs before you.  
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You will not be required to pay for these pieces of information. These will appear 
automatically on your PC screen when it is your turn to play.  
It is important to note that the first four players will not receive this second kind of 
information. On the contrary, from the fifth player onwards, players will receive all relevant 
information regarding previous decisions.  
 
Whenever you make your decision, you have to press the OK button to confirm your choice. 
As soon an all players have made their decision, on your PC screen you will be informed 
about the right choice to take in that period and your relative payoff. 
 
You will play for 20 periods, in addition to two trial periods at the beginning of the 
experiment. 
At the end, you will be paid (except for the payoff earned during the trial periods) and you 
will be free to leave the laboratory.  
The rules are very simple. However, please do not communicate with other participants 
during the experiment. You are free to put questions to experimenters at any time during trial 
periods raising your hands. 
Good luck! 
  
  
